Fishing at the edge of collapse: 27 Years

of Common Fisheries Policy in Europe by Froese, Rainer
S
ea
 A
ro
un
d 
U
s
The Sea Around Us Project Newsletter
Issue 65 – May/June 2011
The Sea Around Us at the
2nd International Marine
Conservation Congress
by Devon O’Meara, Debbie Shon
and Frederic Le Manach
Continued on page 2 - IMCC
The UBC Fisheries Centrewas unusually quietMay 14-18th, the week
of the 2nd International
Marine Conservation
Congress (IMCC2). Members
of the Sea Around Us Project
made a prominent
appearance, with over 25
representatives attending
the conference, held at the
Victoria Conference Centre
on Vancouver Island in British
Columbia. This conference was
a big event in marine conservation, and
drew over 1,300 academics and
professionals from universities,
governments and NGOs around the world.
The theme of the conference, “Making
Science Matter”, was aimed at creating
discussion between policy makers and
scientists through sessions of themed
symposia, workshops and talks. Many
members of the Sea Around Us Project
experienced this interchange, as
evidenced during the session on the Gulf
of Mexico’s oil spill led by Ashley McCrea-
Strub, where Jennifer Jacquet and Kristin
Kleisner also presented. Following the
talks, a U.S. representative with the Bureau
of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation
and Enforcement expressed his concern
for hasty predictions regarding the
economic and environmental impact of
the oil spill on fisheries in the Gulf of
Mexico. “Science is not truth but it allows
us to get closer to it” remarked Daniel
Pauly, who was in the audience. The
interchange was respectful and
informative, and it underscored one of the
fundamental problems between science
and policy makers that the conference
aimed to address: a communication gap.
Among the many presentations by Sea
Around Us members during IMCC2, media
coverage essentially focused on marine
protected areas (MPA) and the
implications for the ambitious deadline set
by the Convention on Biological Diversity
to protect 10% of marine habitats by 2020.
Daniel Pauly was quoted by Nature News
for commenting on the recent political fad
of MPA establishment: “Now we have a
competition for politicians to see who can
have the biggest one” he said. The article
goes on to explain Pauly’s stance that it
will take more than appealing to a
politicians competitive side to get MPAs
established. Ashley McCrea-Strub was also
Drs Daniel Pauly and Ashley McCrea-Strub participated in a special
session on marine protected areas .
Page 2Sea Around Us – May/June 2011
The Sea Around Us
Project newsletter is
published by the
Fisheries Centre at
the University of
British Columbia.
Six issues of this
newsletter are
published annually.
Subscriptions are free
of charge.
Our mailing address is: UBC Fisheries
Centre, Aquatic Ecosystems Research
Laboratory, 2202 Main Mall, Vancouver,
British Columbia, Canada, V6T 1Z4. Our fax
number is (604) 822-8934, and our email
address is SeaNotes@fisheries.ubc.ca. All
queries, subscription requests, and electronic
address changes should be addressed to
Megan Bailey, Sea Around Us Newsletter
Editor.
The Sea Around Us website may be found
at www.seaaroundus.org and contains up-to-
date information on the Project.
TThe Sea Around Us Project is a scientific collaborationbetween the University of British Columbia and the PewEnvironment Group that began in July 1999. The Pew
Environment Group works around the world to establish
pragmatic, science-based policies that protect our oceans, wild
lands and climate. Pew also sponsors scientific research that
sheds new light on the dimensions of and solutions to the
problems facing the global marine environment.
credited in the article for estimating it would
cost $2 billion per year to run current MPAs at
full capacity compared to the $16.2 billion
already spent on negative subsidies resulting
in increased fishing pressure. Ashley McCrea-
Strub was additionally mentioned by Discovery
News in an article calling attention to her
research on the economic benefits of investing
in large MPAs - “We shouldn’t say we should
never have small MPAs. Some countries don’t
have large EEZs [Exclusive Economic Zones] or
the funds to establish large MPAs”.
The conference centre - and surrounding bars! -
were also a great opportunity for many Sea
Around Us students to widen their network, by
taking advantage of the conference to
make contacts around the world.
Following Leah Biery’s presentation on
estimating global shark catches, a small
line-up formed of individuals waiting to
exchange information and ask more
questions - a common story for many
presenters. Sea Around Us members
collaborating with the Ocean Health
Index (OHI) project were also able to
put a human face to an email contact
for the first time at an OHI reception
hosted by the managing director of
OHI and senior scientist from the New
England aquarium, Steven Katona.
The next edition of the IMCC will take place in the
UK in 2014, and we hope it will be as
successful as IMCC2 for Sea Around Us
members.
Sea Around Us post-docs Jennifer Jacquet, Kristin Kleisner and
Ashley McCrea-Strub, along with Jon Hocevar from
Greenpeace, gave talks on the Gulf  oil spill.
Red Fish Blue Fish,
an Oceanwise
supporter in the
Victoria Harbour,
was a popular
lunch spot for
conference
participants.
IMCC - Continued from page 1
News story links
Nature News article:
http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110516/full/news.2011.292.html
Discovery News article:
http://news.discovery.com/earth/marine-reserves-110516.html
“We shouldn’t say
we should never
have small MPAs.
Some countries
don’t have large
EEZs [Exclusive
Economic Zones]
or the funds to
establish large
MPAs”... Ashley
McCrea-Strub on
MPAs.
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Each and every
attendee met
this challenge
with the usual
generosity of
spirit that
keeps the Sea
Around Us
cohesive and
productive...
Sea Around Us Project:
IMCC 2 presentations
For a few days this May, we moved the Sea Around Us Project to Victoria, B.C. for the 2nd
International Marine Conservation Congress (IMCC).  It would be easier (although not wiser!) to
list the Project members who did not attend, than those who did.  Furthermore, given the breadth
of the presentations, almost every single member’s work – past and current-- was represented.
Preparing the more than 20 conference talks, coordinating travel to Victoria, as well as setting up
and staffing the Sea Around Us booth for the duration of the conference took an extraordinary
amount of foresight, effort, and positive energy.  Each and every attendee met this challenge with
the usual generosity of spirit that keeps the Sea Around Us cohesive and productive – and
exceeded expectations with additional initiatives, such as the BBQ hosted by Michelle Paleczny.
Many members even helped with both the Project’s activities and also volunteered for IMCC itself.
Thank you everyone for your contribution and for making IMCC2 a success.
It Takes a Project
by Daniel Pauly
Sarah Harper: The fisheries of small island countries
Leah Biery: Estimating the global distribution and species composition of the shark fin supply from the
bottom up
Rhona Govender: Small but mighty: The real contribution of small-scale fisheries to global catch
Ashley McCrea-Strub: Global financial investment in marine protected areas
Daniel Pauly: Big reserves are better
Mark Hemmings: Changes in Maldivian fisheries
Colette Wabnitz: The ecological role of green turtles (Chelonia mydas) in Hawaiian and Caribbean
marine ecosystems and implications for conservation
Megan Bailey: Do Europe’s reduction fisheries contribute to sustainability?
Vicky Lam: Climate change and the economics of global fisheries
William Cheung: Global changes in body size, distribution and productivity of marine fishes under
climate change: implications for conservation
Daniel Pauly (on behalf of Wilf Swartz): The spatial expansion of the world’s marine fisheries: 1950 to
present
Michelle Paleczny: Are global marine fisheries starving seabirds?
Marta Coll: Spatial overlap between marine biodiversity, cumulative threats and marine reserves in the
Mediterranean Sea
Jennifer Jacquet: Public vs. personal impressions of the Gulf oil spill
Ashley McCrae-Strub: Oil and fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico: potential impacts on catch
Kristin Kleisner (on behalf of Rashid Sumaila): Impact of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill on the
economics of U.S. Gulf fisheries
Dirk Zeller Arctic fisheries catches in Russia, USA and Canada: Baselines for neglected ecosystems
Frederic LeManach Magnitude of missing catches in official fisheries statistics and implications for the
local population – the example of Madagascar
Jennifer Jacquet Intimacy through the Internet: Why Conservation Needs the Web
Sarika Cullis-Suzuki Regional fisheries management organizations: effectiveness and accountability on
the high seas
Pablo Trujillo See-Food from Space
Kristin Kleisner Exploring indicators of fishing pressures in the context of the OHI with a focus on
correcting the Marine Trophic Index for geographic expansion
Dalal Al-Abdulrazzak Gaining Perspective on What We’ve Lost
Megan Bailey (on behalf of Rashid Sumaila): MPA cost-effectiveness study
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 Fishing at the edge of collapse: 27 Years
of Common Fisheries Policy in Europe
by Rainer Froese
In 2001, I returned to Germany from thePhilippines, where I had worked for 10 yearsmostly on tropical fish and fisheries. I soon
realized that the status of European fish stocks was
no better than that in developing countries.
Despite considerable efforts by hundreds of
European fisheries scientists, data were lacking for
most stocks, and even for the best researched
ones, internationally agreed reference points, such
as the maximum yield that can be taken
sustainably (MSY), and the stock size required to
support such catch were just not available. So, in
the winter of 2008/2009 I sat down and analyzed
the available data myself. The results made me
want to cry. With few exceptions, fish stocks in
Europe had been systematically decimated, even
more so than in the rest of the world. In stock after
stock, excessive fishing of 3 to 5 times above the
internationally agreed reference point had
reduced biomasses to 10 - 20% of their
unexploited size. Extreme fishing pressure had
shrunk cod to half of the length that our parents
were used to. It had also reduced the natural adult
lifespan of many years to a single spawning event,
at best. Such fishing had effectively turned multi-
spawning cod into single-spawning salmon.
It took me a while to realize that the sad state of
European fish stocks was not a natural or societal
failure that management just could not overcome
despite its best efforts. No, the fact that most fish
stocks balanced on the edge of collapse was the
desired outcome of the Common Fisheries Policy
of Europe (CFP), in force since 1984. In September
1996, the European Commission had asked the
Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES), its
main scientific advisory body for fisheries, to
provide reference points that carry a low
probability of stock collapse. ICES obediently
provided limit reference points for stock size and
fishing pressure and so-called ‘precautionary
reference points’ slightly away from those limits.
Fisheries management subsequently used these
boundary posts of viable stock sizes as targets for
fisheries management, but overshot the
precautionary boundary for catches by 40 - 50%
on average, effectively aiming for stock sizes on
the slope to collapse.
Much of European fisheries research was
dedicated to determining these boundary posts
and next year’s stock size with the highest possible
precision. But why had my hard-working
colleagues accepted such a questionable role,
which strikes me as being similar to that of a
medical doctor at a water boarding session? Why
were their considerable research efforts not
dedicated to determining fishing regimes that
maximize benefits for society while minimizing
negative impacts on the stocks and the marine
ecosystems? Why were economists and social
scientists not welcome in ICES advisory bodies?
Why was the public not fully informed about the
dismal state of European fish stocks? Why were
fishers not informed about sustainable high
catches and profits that healthy stocks could
provide? Why were the internationally agreed
reference points for sustainable fisheries
management not made available and promoted
by ICES?
These questions go to the root of the failure of
fisheries management in Europe. The fishes in
Europe’s seas are owned by the citizens of Europe.
These citizens have entrusted responsible
management of this public good to their national
Governments, where it is typically given to the
Ministry of Agriculture with its associated research
institutes. These institutes employ the fisheries
scientists. Typically the ministry-approved heads of
such institutes or someone from the ministry are
the national delegates to the ICES Council, which
determines ICES policies. ICES working groups give
advice on stock sizes and potential catches to the
European Commission. After extensive
consultations, the Commission makes
recommendations for fisheries management and
for next year’s catches. At several annual meetings
in Brussels, the 27 EC ministers decide about
fisheries management rules and also decide for
each of the European stocks the catches that may
be taken in the following year. Back at home, the
ministries and their agencies administer the
implementation of the decisions made in Brussels.
They also control compliance by fishers. Such
concentration of explorative, legislative and
executive power within one ministry does not
Continued on page 5 - CFP at the edge
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exactly resemble what we learned in school
about the importance of separation of powers in
a democratic system.
If this system was working in the interest of those
who paid for it, fine. But clearly, it is not. ICES has
blocked inclusion of social sciences (including
economics), effective public outreach, and
anything resembling ICES taking a stand on
behalf of European fish stocks. It also has limited
ICES advisory outputs to what the ministers
deem useful for their negotiations in Brussels.
Enforcement of fisheries management by
member states is lax, with cases where actual
catches exceeded the agreed amount by more
than 100%. Fisheries in Europe are subsidized to
an amount that in some cases equals the value of
the landed fish. Without these subsidies,
European fisheries would be bankrupt, because
the cost of hunting the few remaining fish exceed
the income from selling the catch.
Why did the ministers not act in the interests of
the citizens who have elected them and who pay
their salaries? Because the ministers are under
constant pressure by the fishing lobby and only
under occasional, if any, pressure by the public,
which is made to believe that fisheries
management is decided by bureaucrats in
Brussels. The degree to which the European
fishing lobby has infiltrated the system is
astounding. Although the economic contribution
of the fishing sector is less than, e.g., that of the
industry producing sewing-machines, their
political influence is considerable, probably
because the public still has romantic notions
about fishing, and because the media are drawn
to stories of fishers blocking ports or dumping
fish in the streets of Brussels. The European
Commission has set up Regional Advisory
Councils (RACs) which, among other, give
recommendations on how to implement the
scientific advice given by ICES. In these RACs, the
fishing lobby has 2/3 of the seats, with the
remaining seats being shared by all other
stakeholders. If no consensus is reached, then
decisions on recommendations are taken by
simple majority, such as held by the fishing lobby,
while other stakeholders may submit their
minority opinion. But the main influence of the
fishing lobby is probably exercised through their
cozy personal relationships with the civil servants
in charge of national fisheries, many of whom
firmly believe that it is their job to protect the
rights of their national fishing sector, including
the rights to obtain subsidies and to overfish.
The role of the European fishing lobbies is a
particularly unpleasant one: In order to increase
allowable catches, the lobby routinely discredits
the scientists and their advice, denies the depleted
status of stocks, fights the establishment of
protected areas, defends the usage of destructive
gears, insists on the right to catch juvenile fish, and
requests the abandonment of closed spawning
seasons and areas. In doing so, they destroyed the
very foundation that fishing depends upon. As a
result, profit margins of European fishers are about
3-6%, whereas profit margins of their colleagues in
New Zealand, which has successfully reformed its
fisheries, are about 40%. Given the considerable
influence of the European fishing lobby on the
system, why do they not act in the interest of their
fishers, whose profits could multiply in a few years
if stocks were allowed to recover? The answer to
this question eludes me.
Fisheries management in Europe culminates in the
closed-door meetings of the Council of Ministers.
While the public is exclude from this debate about
a public resource, the fishing lobby is always only a
cellphone away and often physically present in the
building, being supplied with press cards by their
national delegations. Decisions in the Council are
typically taken by a 2/3 majority but need
consensus if the Commission feels that its
proposal has been ignored. That was recently the
case in a preparatory meeting dealing with the
threatened Atlantic bluefin tuna. The member
states were unhappy with the proposal by the
Commission which followed the scientific advice.
They asked the Commission to leave the room,
and then agreed unanimously with a few
abstentions on much higher catches.
While the ministers may change every few years,
their civil servant advisors with their cozy
relationships to the fishing lobby stay on and
oppose any true change. As a result of years of
midnight micro-management, the CFP has
accumulated over 600 regulations, many of which
contradict each other. For example, regulated
mesh sizes catch smaller fishes than the fishers are
allowed to land. These fish are then dumped dead
at sea. The setting of next year’s catches has been
described as political horse trading, with unholy
alliances supporting each other in an effort to
secure the highest possible share for the national
fishing sector. Thus, Germany and Poland will
support higher French catches in the Atlantic, and
France will support higher catches in the Baltic. As
a result of such coalitions, the cod and herring
stocks in German waters are more strongly
CFP at the edge - Continued from page 4
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overfished than adjacent stocks. Since the
proceedings of the meetings remain secret, the
ministers can happily go home and wear blue ties
at the next ‘Save the Oceans’ event, because
clearly, they themselves fought hard for healthy
oceans and ecosystem-based fisheries
management, but others prevailed.
The situation described above is what Maria
Damanaki was confronted with when, in 2010, she
took over the post of Commissioner of DG Mare,
the European Directorate General in charge of
European fisheries. Building on the excellent
Green Paper on the Reform of the Common
Fisheries Policy of 2009, which officially
documents much of what I have described above,
she confronted the Council of Ministers with clear
demands for rebuilding European fish stocks until
2015, in accordance with international
agreements.
Her courage has shown some success: Europe is
gradually abandoning the fishing at the edge of
collapse, and ICES now provides at least one of the
international reference points (Fmsy) for 39 out of
190 commercial stocks. The number of stocks that
are known to be on the slope to collapse has also
slightly decreased. But will this be enough to
overcome overfishing in Europe and in the rest of
the World, where much of the European fleet is
operating and where Europe plays a crucial role as
the largest importer of seafood products?
The proposal of the Commission for the reform of
the CFP will be officially published on 13 July this
year. Considering the mess that we are still in, it
proposes big steps in the right direction. The
internationally agreed reference points will finally
be recognized in Europe, allowing the stocks to
grow away from the edge of collapse. Discarding
of perfectly good fish for bureaucratic reasons will
be phased out. But the proposal clearly falls short
of similar reforms that have been enacted in New
Zealand, Australia and the USA. These countries
have precautionary fishing targets, slightly away
from the reference points to account for
uncertainty, and they close fisheries when stocks
enter the slope to collapse. In contrast,
Europe will have no precautionary margins and
will gradually reduce fishing pressure only when
stocks are on the slope to collapse, with no default
rule for closing a fishery. Where the other countries
have phased out or drastically reduced subsidies,
the Commission only proposes to reshuffle
subsidies. Also, the root causes of the CFP failure
will not be addressed, i.e., the concentration of
power with the agriculture ministers and the
excessive influence of the fishing lobby. Such
restraint may not be surprising, because the
Commission is well aware that these very
ministers and their lobbies will decide the
implementation of the proposal and the future of
fish and fishing in Europe.
Do I have a final wish? Yes. Given the systemic
failure of fisheries management as enacted by
the ministries of agriculture, I wish Europe would
leave them in charge of aquaculture, but give the
management of wild fish to the ministers of
environment. The Marine Strategy Framework
Directive of 2008 shows that they have
understood that only healthy ecosystems can
support healthy fish stocks, which, in turn, can
provide healthy profits from environmentally-
friendly fisheries.
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